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SCHOOL PRAYER, NEUTRALITY, AND THE
OPEN FORUM: WHY WE DON'T NEED A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
ARNOLD H. LOEWYt
As theproposed constitutional amendment topermitprayer inpub-
lic schools captures increasing national attention and debate, Professor
Loewy argues that in the context of true state neutrality, schoolprayer
does not violate the establishment clause. Noting that state sponsorshp
(impermissible) is to be distinguishedfrom state neutrality (permissible),
he contends that at least two methods ofproviding the opportunity to
pray in school may be allowed A4 policy that grants open accessibility
of classroom use to all student groups, religious or otherwise, would be
constitutional. A policy that permits individually selectedphilosophical
recitations by studentsprobably would be constitutional. Because these
methodsfully accommodate any needforprayer, and because we do not
need prayer which is any less voluntary than that arising from these
methods, Professor Loewy concludes that the proposed school prayer
amendment should not be added to the Constitution.
No less an office holder than the President of the United States has deter-
mined that this nation needs a constitutional amendment authorizing volun-
tary school prayer.' This article contends that truly voluntary prayer already
is permissible in school, and that any prayer which is less voluntary is neither
necessary nor desirable.2 A state, school board, or teacher3 can allow prayer
by establishing an open forum from which a student can say any of several
t Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill- B.S. 1961, J.D. 1963,
Boston University; LL.M. 1964, Harvard University. The author is indebted to Frederick S. Bar-
bour, a second-year law student at the University of North Carolina for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. The proposed amendment provides: "Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to
prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall
be required by the United States or by any state to participate in prayer." Letter from the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress to Arnold H. Loewy (May 21, 1982). President Reagan was quoted as say-
ing: "The Amendment we'll propose will restore the right to pray . . . . Changing the
Constitution is a mammoth task. It should never be easy. But in this case I believe we can restore
a freedom that our Constitution was always meant to protect." N.Y. Times, May 7, 1982, at B10,
col 1.
2. The term "voluntary" is of course a sliding-scale term. Very few choices are totally vol-
untary or totally coerced. Sometimes the Supreme Court is willing to describe a choice as volun-
tary in one context but involuntary in another. Compare Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (noncustodial search; knowledge of right to withhold consent immaterial), with Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation; instruction of rights required).
Although the proposed constitutional amendment forbids making public prayer a require-
ment, see supra note 1, the caveat is, however, a far cry from making the amendment truly volun-
tary. Consider the following piece of precious overstatement by Art Buchwald:
The pro-prayer people say that the constitutional amendment is voluntary and a
child will not have to pray if he doesn't want to. The anti-prayer people maintain that
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things, including a prayer. What the state cannot do is favor prayer over other
forms of speech.
A prayer either written or sanctioned by the school board or teacher can-
not be neutral. Even so innocuous a prayer as the Regent prayer invalidated
peer pressure as well as teacher pressure will force a kid to pray whether he has the
choice or not.
The latter group sees this kind of scenario:
"All right, children, we will now open with a morning prayer. Those sinners who
don't believe in God can either stand in the back of the room with their faces to the wall
or hide in the clothes closet."
"Come, you little Bolsheviks, hurry it up so the rest of us can get on with seeking
divine guidance. Where are you going, Tony?"
"I'm going to the back of the room. I already prayed at home this morning."
"And you think that's enough?"
"It's enough for me."
"Look at Tony, children. He is a perfect example of a secular humanist. He'd
rather stand in the back of the room than pray to God. Does anyone know where Tony
is going to wind up with his attitude?"
"In Hell."
"Very good, Charles. And who will he find in Hell?"
"Satan."
"And what will Satan make him do?"
"He'll make him feed the flames of a fiery furnace, and Tony will have to wear a
tail, and he'll be screaming all the time and fighting off snakes, but it won't do him any
good."
"That's absolutely right, Enid. Who knows what else will happen to him?"
"Blackbirds will peck his eyes out, and he'll have a stomach ache all the time and
his toes will drop off."
"Very good, Everett. Well, what do you have to say to that, Tony?"
"I'd still rather stand in the back of the room."
"Are there any other communists in the class who would like to join him? All right,
Tony, you seem to be the only one. Go to the back and I don't want to see your ugly face
until I tell you to take your seat. Now, class, let us bow our heads and pray for Tony's
soul! Heavenly Father, there is always one rotten apple in the barrel ....
Buchwald, The Pupil Without a Prayer, Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1982 § V, at 82, col. 1. Much
of the inspiration for Buchwald's satire could have come from the testimony of Edward Schempp,
the plaintiff in 4bington School Dist. Y. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), which invalidated school
sponsored prayer and Bible reading:
Edward Schempp, the children's father, testified that after careful consideration he
had decided that he should not have Roger or Donna excused from attendance at these
morning ceremonies. Among his reasons were the following. He said that he thought his
children would be "labeled as 'odd balls" before their teachers and classmates every
school day; that children, like Roger's and Donna's classmates, were liable "to lump all
particular religious difference[s] or religious objections [together] as 'atheism'" and that
today the word "atheism" is often connected with "atheistic communism," and has "very
bad" connotations, such as "un-American" or "anti-Red," with overtones of possible
immorality. Mr. Schempp pointed out that due to the events of the morning exercises
following in rapid succession, the Bible reading, the Lord's Prayer, the Flag Salute, and
the announcements, excusing his children from the Bible reading would mean that prob-
ably they would miss hearing the announcements so important to children. He testified
also that if Roger and Donna were excused from Bible reading they would have to stand
in the hall outside their "homeroom" and that this carried with it the imputation of
punishment for bad conduct.
Id. at 208 n.3 (quoting from trial court decision, 201 F. Supp. 815, 818 (1962)).
3. There can be little doubt that action of a state-employed teacher can constitute state
action. Cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979) (because public school teachers perform an
important governmental function, a state may deny aliens the opportunity to serve in that capac-
ity); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (school authorities acting under color of state
law are governed by the fourteenth amendment).
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in Engel v. Vitale4 is not neutral: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depen-
dence upon thee, and we beg th blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our country." Anyone who seriously thinks that this prayer is neutral
should consider the following equally "neutral" prayer: "We acknowledge the
nonexistence of God and its inability to bestow anything upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our country.
' 5
Although the dividing line between state-sanctioned prayer and state-
permitted prayer is elusive, it can and should be drawn. The key is neutrality.
6
This article will propose two methods of permitting but not sanctioning
prayer.
Method I is for the state to make classrooms available before or after
school or during recess to any groups of students who want to meet in them. If
accessibility is nonideological (Le., it matters not whether the group consists of
Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Atheists, Republicans, Democrats, sports fans,
animal lovers, or ceramics enthusiasts), the school should not be required to
forbid prayer.
Method II is to allow a different student to begin each class with a philo-
sophical recitation that he or she either composes or chooses. For this Method
to be lawful, each student must be given an opportunity to speak or the philos-
opher of the day must be chosen at random without regard to the content of
his or her message. From the school's perspective a message of Atheism, Sa-
tan Worship, or Secular Humanism must be accorded the same dignity as a
prayer to God.
Part I of this article will discuss the constitutionality of Method I. Part II
will discuss the constitutionality of Method II. Part III will examine unconsti-
tutional attempts to permit prayer in school and explain how they differ from
the proposed methods.
I
Unless it can be distinguished from last term's case of Widmar v. Vincent,
7
Method I is constitutional. Widmar involved a successful challenge to a regu-
lation promulgated by the University of Missouri Board of Curators which
forbade prayer on campus. The challenger was Cornerstone, an organization
4. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
5. I attempted the following "neutral prayer" in my Constitutional Law class: "To whom it
may concern: Please aid these students in their efforts to fathom the very nearly unfathomable
Supreme Court decisions under the establishment clause." One student objected to the prayer
because "to whom it may concern" implied that it did concern somebody. Perhaps "to whom it
may concern, if anybody" would be neutral, but one cannot be certain.
6. The Court generally preaches neutrality in establishment clause cases. See, e.g., Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). This is, however, an area in which the Court
exhibits more than its ordinary constitutional schizophrenia. For example, the Court has forbid-
den religious groups from receiving the state aid available to nonreligious groups. The Court has
also mandated that unemployment compensation be paid to those refusing to work on religious
grounds even when the secularly motivated nonworker goes uncompensated. See infra text ac-
companying notes 82-85. For the reasons proffered in this article, the author contends that at least
with regard to school prayer, "neutrality" is the best policy.
7. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
1982]
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of evangelical Christian students that sought university recognition and the
concomitant right to hold its prayer meetings on campus.8 Part of the Univer-
sity's justification for excluding Cornerstone was its contention that the estab-
lishment clause precluded recognition.9 The Court rejected this argument,
and held that the discrimination against Cornerstone was forbidden by the
first amendment's freedom of speech clause.
The constitutionality of proposed Method I must be evaluated under the
three-part test reiterated in Widmar:
[A] policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a
three pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] must have a sec-
ular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . .; finally, the
[policy] must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' "10
Although the Court had no difficulty finding that the open forum sought
in Widmar, which did not discriminate either for or against religion, would
have a secular purpose, it is arguable that an open forum adopted for the
express purpose of allowing prayer would be unconstitutional. 1I The Supreme
Court in Widmar distinguished McCollum v. Board of Education,12 which had
invalidated religious instruction in the classroom as part of a released time
program, on the ground that MfcCollum permitted school facilities to be used
for instruction by religious groups but not by others.' 3 Consequently, when
classrooms are opened for use as a forum, it is critical that those announcing
their opening emphasize all the uses to which they can be put.
The primary effect test presents a more difficult hurdle. The Court distin-
guished between "primary effect," which is unconstitutional, and "incidental
benefit," which is constitutional.' 4 As it said in Widmar:
8. University recognition frequently is a prerequisite to holding meetings on campus. The
term "recognition" does not necessarily imply approval of the organization's aims. See Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
9. The University also argued that the Missouri Constitution requires stricter separation of
church and state than the United States Constitution. The Court found it unnecessary to decide
that issue. 102 S. Ct. at 277.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 275 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
11. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1044-
45, reh' kdenied, 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982). Motive can be important in assessing the constitu-
tionality of the legislative purpose. See, eg., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See gener.
ally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An .4pproach to The Problems of Unconstitutional Motive, 1971
Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation In Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
12. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
13. 102 S. Ct. at 275 n.10. McCollum could also be distinguished on the ground that:
the instructors were subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of
schools [and]. . .[s]tudents who did not choose to take the religious instruction were not
released from public school duties; they were required to leave their classrooms and go
to some other place in the school building for pursuit of their secular studies. On the
other hand, students who were released from secular study for the religious instructions
were required to be present at the religious classes. Reports of their presence or absence
were to be made to their secular teachers.
102 S. Ct. at 208-09.
14. Compare Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (religious exercises re-
quired by the state have primary effect of advancing religion) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
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We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely effects. It
is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will
benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has ex-
plained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "inciden-
tal" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary
advancement" of religion.
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at
UMKC15 would be "incidental" within the meaning of our cases.
16
The Court relied on two factors in finding the benefit incidental rather
than primary:
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any im-
primatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. [S]uch a
policy "would no more commit the University. . . to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students for a
Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or any other
group eligible to use its facilities.
17
To avoid the appearance of an imprimatur, a school wishing to adopt
Method I should clearly advertise the general availability of the classrooms.
For example, a school newspaper might carry the following advertisement:
CLASSROOMS AVAILABLE FOR GROUP
MEETINGS
Classrooms I, II, III, IV, and V will be available for group
meetings from 7:30-8:00 a.m., from 3:00-3:30 p.m., and dur-
ing recess and lunch. You may discuss school work, poli-
tics, religion, sports, hobbies or any other subject. Please
reserve the room from Vice Principal Smith before using it.
The second Widmar factor may be more difficult for a public school to
achieve: "[T]he forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as
religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC.
The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important
index of secular effect."'
8
To a public school that has traditionally operated an open forum and now
simply wishes to include religious groups, the Widmar logic should apply, at
least so long as several nonreligious groups continue to use the forum. When a
forum is created for the first time and is primarily used for prayer, greater
664 (1970) (tax exemptions that afford indirect economic benefit to churches do not have primary
effect of advancing religion).
15. The University of Missouri at Kansas City was the branch of the University involved in
this litigation. [footnote added by author].
16. 102 S. Ct. at 276.
17. Id. (quoting with approval Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
18. Id. at 277.
1982]
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difficulties may ensue, particularly in view of the Court's final observation on
the establishment issue in Widmar: "At least in the absence of empirical evi-
dence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the fo-
rum's primary effect." 19
Even if religious groups do dominate the open forum, the Court might
permit the forum to continue if it were clear that the school was not responsi-
ble for the domination. Then the Court might say that the primary effect is to
allow free expression and that the school is no more responsible for religious
domination than a school where sports was the leading topic would be respon-
sible for athletic domination.20 In such a case, however, it may be critical that
the school's attorney clearly establish the school's lack of responsibility for the
students' interest in religion.
A final potential distinction between Widmar and Method I is the age of
the students. In a footnote, the Widmar Court noted that "[u]niversity stu-
dents are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger
students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of
neutrality toward religion." 21 The obvious negative pregnant is that younger
students are more impressionable and will (might?) not appreciate the policy
of neutrality. Certainly impressionability was a factor in the School Prayer
Cases 22 and has been used by some courts to disapprove of policies such as
Method I.23
The concept of impressionability was eminently sound in the School
Prayer Cases. There, however, the problem was accurate, not inaccurate per-
ceptions. Specifically, the "impressionable" students accurately perceived that
the State was favoring theism over atheism, which is not permitted by the
establishment clause.
24
To predicate an invalidation of Method I on impressionability, however,
expands that concept beyond all bounds. Yet, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has refused to sanction Method I on that ground:
To an impressionable student even the mere appearance of secular
involvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has
placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic
inference is too dangerous to permit. An adolescent may perceive
19. Id.
20. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (upholding a Sunday closing law
with the observation that "the 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
or all religions").
21. 102 S. Ct. at 276 n.14.
22. See, eg., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 298-99 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cf. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212-32
(1948) (Frankfurter, J.) (tracing the history of separation between church and public schools).
23. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970
(1981); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 15, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 51, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
24. Bible reading not only favors theism over atheism; it favors some forms of theism over
others. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281-87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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"voluntary" school prayer in a different light if he were to see the
captain of the school's football team, the student body president, or
the leading actress in a dramatic production participating in commu-
nal prayer meetings in the "captive audience" setting of a school.
25
To say the least, this presents a rather unflattering view of our nation's youth.
It strains credulity to believe that an adolescent who saw a student leader
praying in a classroom reserved by the student would assume that the student
was praying because he was expected to pray, rather than because he wanted
to pray. The court's derogatory description of students stems in part from its
rather Spartan view of the educational process: 26 "Our nation's elementary
and secondary schools play a unique role in transmitting basic and fundamen-
tal values to our youth. As Alexander Pope noted, 'Tis Education forms the
common mind,/Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclin'd.'- 27
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has adopted a less Spartan view of the
educational process: "In our system students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They
may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved."
28
Perhaps the strongest indication that the Supreme Court would apply
Widmar to public schools is Tinker v. Des Moines School Distrit.2 9 In Tinker,
the Court applied a university level academic freedom case 30 to the right of
high school, junior high, and arguably elementary school students to protest
the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands in school:31 "The classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon lead-
ers trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which dis-
25. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d at 978.
26. The term Spartan is accurate. As the Court said in Meyer v. Nebraska:
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the
males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to
official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that
any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
27. 635 F.2d at 978. The poem from which the appellate court quotes is Epistle I, To Sir
Richard Tenple, Lord Viscount Cobhan, from A. Pope's MORAL ESSAY in A. POPE, EPISTLES TO
SEVERAL PERSONS (MORAL ESSAYS) (F. Bateson ed. 1969). "Epistle I" has been interpreted as
reflecting the view that members of the elite ruling class are stable and predictable, while the
common man is unstable and unpredictable, influenced by all that he experiences, including edu-
cation. See R. BROWER, ALEXANDER POPE: THE POETRY OF ALLUSION (1959).
28. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). See also
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
29. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
30. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (New York's teacher loyalty laws
held unconstitutional).
31. Petitioner John Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old,
attended high school in Des Moines, Iowa. Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker was a 13-year-old stu-
dent attending junior high school. Paul and Hope Tinker, ages 8 and 11, respectively, and brother
and sister to petitioners John and Mary Beth, also wore arm bands to their schools. 258 F. Supp.
971, 972 n.l (S.D. Iowa 1966). Paul was in the second grade and Hope in the fifth grade. 393 U.S.
at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
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covers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.' "32 If a university academic freedom case can be ap-
plied to a public school situation, Widmar should at least permit a public
school to adopt Method I. 33
The final establishment test, "excessive entanglement," has been the sub-
ject of extensive academic commentary 34 which need not be reviewed here.
Suffice it to say that the Court's observation in Widmar "that the University
would risk greater 'entanglement' by attempting to enforce its exclusion of
religious worship and religious speech" than it would by allowing such wor-
ship and speech35 applies to Method I. For example, if a rule prohibiting
prayer applied to an open forum, the school would have to decide whether a
sports club student's uttering "May God protect our quarterback in next
week's game" constituted a prayer.
36
It has been argued that public schools, unlike universities, require club
activities to be monitored by teachers or administrative personnel and that the
injection of such personnel constitutes "excessive entanglement. ' 37 This argu-
ment is premised on the unconstitutionality of paying public school teachers to
aid religion.38 If the monitoring were deemed to be in aid of access to the
open forum and not exercise of religion, however, there would be no constitu-
tional problem.
In Widmar the university argued that it could not let Cornerstone meet in
a publicly financed building because that would aid a religion in contraven-
tion of Tilton v. Richardson.39 The Court rejected this argument, holding that
use of the building was not a religious use within the meaning of Titon.40 By
32. 393 U.S. at 512. (quoting 385 U.S. at 603).
33. Many academic freedom cases involve a conflict between the considered judgment of
school officials on the one hand and the right to diversity of views on the other. E.g., Board of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). By contrast, Method I could be upheld by simply defer-
ring to the school board's judgment to allow individual students the freedom to be diverse.
34. The "excessive entanglement" test was first explicitly articulated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397-U.S. 664 (1970): "No perfect or absolute separation [of Church and State] is really possible;
the very existence of the Religion Clause is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark
boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." Id at 678. Commentators have roundly criticized
the test for being inconsistently applied, for appearing to be a rationalization rather than a ration-
ale, and as requiring too much subjectivity to be useful as a test of constitutionality. See Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1392-94 (1981); Ripple, The Entanglement
Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten- Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980); Schotten,
The Establishment Clause andExcessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional
Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 207
(1979).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 275 n.11 (quoting with approval Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1318 (8th
Cir. 1980)).
36. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting difficulty of allowing the
Pope to deliver a sermon but not celebrate a Mass on the National Mall).
37. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d at 979; Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union
High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
38. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
40. 102 S. Ct. at 275 n.12.
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that same logic, the monitoring of an open forum that at a particular moment
is religious, is not the monitoring of religion.
Thus, Widmar appears to support Method I as a constitutional way of
allowing voluntary prayer.
II
Method II, which allows each student on an alternating basis to begin the
day with a philosophical recitation, is less clearly constitutional than Method
I. It involves greater teacher participation, and consequently greater potential
for unconstitutional manipulation. In addition, it involves the entire class, not
just those who voluntarily choose to participate.41 Nevertheless, a persuasive
case can be made for the constitutionality of the practice.
There is certainly a secular legislative purpose. As noted earlier, the Court
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents said, "The classroom is peculiarly the 'mar-
ketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion.' "42 It is doubtful that any process can fulfill this end better than Method
II, particularly if the class were allowed to discuss the meaning and signifi-
cance of the recitation.
Primary effect is another matter. On the one hand, if in a given class-
room, ninety percent of the children say Baptist prayers, it is certainly argua-
ble that the primary effect is to advance the Baptist religion. On the other
hand, if the school and teachers are careful both to remain neutral and to
make certain that the students understand their neutrality, the Court could
find the primary effect to be the interchange of ideas.43
Stone v. Graham44 supports the constitutionality of this practice. In the
course of invalidating a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in the classroom, the Court said, 'This is not a case in which
the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civiliza-
tion, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."' 45 Although the Court's concep-
tion of "appropriate study. . . of comparative religion" is not clear, Method II
so nearly approaches the Tinker admonition of learning "out of a multitude of
tongues rather than through any kind of authoritative selection" that the
Court should sustain it.
46
41. Even if one could be excused from participation, the exercise is not as voluntary as
Method I in which the student chooses to participate. See supra note 2.
42. 385 U.S. at 589, quotedin Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
43. In order to ensure the appearance of state neutrality, it may be necessary to limit the role
of the teacher in commenting on philosophical recitations. The extent to which teacher participa-
tion must be limited is beyond the scope of this article.
44. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
45. Id. at 42.
46. That the multitude of tongues may happen to speak with the same voice does not destroy
1982]
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Because of the need to ensure teacher neutrality, the analysis of "exces-
sive entanglement" is more elaborate for Method II than for Method I. Any
religious instruction involves some entanglement. For example, a teacher of
comparative religions would not be allowed to teach that Catholicism is the
one true faith and all other religions are the works of the devil.47 Similarly a
teacher of evolution 48 cannot teach that evolution is necessarily wrong because
the Bible says that Earth was created six thousand years ago in six days. 49
Since Method II requires student rather than teacher selection of the philo-
sophical recitation, it may create less entanglement than the above
hypotheticals.5
0
Significantly, the standard is "excessive entanglement," not "mere entan-
glement." No Supreme Court decision has invalidated a practice on this
ground unless the practice could inject the State into controlling some aspect
of a church5' or a church school.52 Given the total dependence on student
choice, it seems unlikely that the Court would make this case the first to apply
the "excessive entanglement" doctrine to a public school.53
this value. Even homogeneity among the students, if voluntary, is better than an authoritative
determination of acceptable philosophies.
47. This illustration is purely hypothetical. The author does not suggest that Catholicism in
fact teaches any such doctrine.
48. A subject that, if not taught, would raise serious constitutional questions. See Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a law forbidding the teaching of evolution). The Court
in Epperson reasoned that the Arkansas law selected "from the body of knowledge a particular
segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular
religious group." Id. at 103.
49. This is not to say that a school is forbidden to give balanced treatment to "creationism."
The establishment clause forbids placing God above Darwin in a public school; the clause does
not forbid discussion of a religious theory, even if a judge believes the theory unscientific. To the
extent that McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), is contrary, it
should not be followed.
50. But not necessarily. The relative certainty of what can and cannot be done in the above
hypotheticals may preclude excessive entanglement. Indeed, when implementing Method II,
some limitation on the role of the teacher may be necessary. See supra note 43.
51. See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (the first and
fourteenth amendments were violated by a state court's invalidating a Bishop's defrockment). For
cases decided before the entanglement doctrine was enunciated, see Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (free exercise and the
establishment clauses of the first amendment forbid any application of a departure-from-doctrine
test by a civil court resolving a dispute over property); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94 (1952) (religious freedom encompasses the power of religious bodies to decide for themselves
matters of church government, as well as faith and doctrine).
52. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
53. The Court has not really had an opportunity to apply "excessive entanglement" to a
public school The only public school case arising since the doctrine originated in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and became firmly entrenched in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), was Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), which invalidated the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in public schools because of a forbidden religious purpose.
Since the concept of "excessive entanglement" is designed to keep state and church from
regulating each other's affairs, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 625, and since the state must
regulate its schools and teachers anyway, "excessive entanglement" does not seem to be a likely
ground for invalidating a practice that has a primary secular purpose and effect.
Political divisiveness is perhaps an independent form of "excessive entangiement." See Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 72 (1975); but see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines.- the
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III
Having examined one clearly (I) and one probably (11) constitutional
method of permitting school prayer, it is useful to contrast them to those meth-
ods that are not constitutional. In Engel v. Vitale 54 the Court invalidated the
ritualistic recitation of a prayer written by the New York Board of Regents.55
Engel was clearly concerned with state sponsorship of prayer, not its voluntary
recitation.
[The framers] knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an
end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not writ-
ten to destroy either. They knew rather that it was written to quiet
well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an
awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues
to make them speak only the religious thoughts that government
wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government
wanted them to pray to. It is neither sacreligious nor antireligious to
say that each separate government in this country should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance.5 6
The Supreme Court in Abington School District v. Schempp5 7 forbade
teacher-led ritualistic Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. "In the
relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a posi-
tion of neutrality."58 Obviously, when a teacher or some other state official
determines which prayer is said, there can be no neutrality.
Similarly, the Court in Stone v. Graham59 invalidated state sponsorship of
the Ten Commandments. There was no doubt that the state statute authoriz-
ing the posting of the Commandments constituted sponsorship.60 The serious
Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and BadPublic Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980).
Even so, political divisiveness would not apply to Method II. It is hardly "divisive" to give every
student an opportunity to present his or her favorite philosophical recitation.
54. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
55. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 435.
57. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
58. Id. at 226.
59. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
60. The statute provided:
(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, provided sufficient
funds are available as provided in subsection (3) of this section, to ensure that a durable,
permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in each public
elementary and secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth. The copy shall be
sixteen (16) inches wide by twenty (20) inches high.
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning the
purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and
the Common Law of the United States."
(3) The copies required by this section shall be purchased with funds made available
through voluntary contributions made to the state treasurer for the purposes of this
section.
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issue was whether the Commandments could be deemed secular rather than
religious. Contrary to statutory declaration, they were held to be religious.61
Although no other Supreme Court case has dealt directly with prayer,
62
such issues have regularly arisen in the lower courts. Two of the more inter-
esting cases are Karen B. v. Treen63 and Collins v. Chandler Un[fled School
District.64
Karen B. involved a Jefferson Parish (Louisiana) School Board resolution
permitting a minute of voluntary prayer followed by a minute of silent
meditation:6
5
Under the school board guidelines, each teacher must ask if any stu-
dent wishes to volunteer a prayer, and, if no student wishes to do so,
the teacher may offer a prayer of his own. If the teacher elects not to
pray, then the period of silent meditation would be observed imme-
diately. The school board guidelines provide that no prayer may be
longer than one minute in duration.
Jefferson Parish has also made elaborate provisions for excusing
students who do not want to participate in the prayer portion of the
morning exercises. According to a school board letter explaining the
program to parents, any student who desires to participate in the
minute of prayer must submit the express written permission of his
parents and make a verbal request to join in the exercise. Students
without this permission may either report to class, where they must
remain seated and quiet throughout the morning exercises, or remain
outside the classroom under other supervision.
66
Several witnesses contended that the statute had a secular legislative pur-
pose not unlike the marketplace of ideas theory ascribed to Method II: "These
witnesses stated that the purpose of the school prayer program was to increase
religious tolerance by exposing school children to beliefs different from their
own and to develop in students a greater esteem for themselves and others by
1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 436, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978) (codified at Ky. REv. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)),
quoted in 449 U.S. at 39-40 n.1.
61. 449 U.S. at 41.
62. Two Supreme Court cases dealt with "release-time" programs, whereby students who so
chose were "released" from their schoolwork to pursue religious studies during a specified time
each week. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), held violative of the establishment
clause a plan whereby the religious instruction occurred in the students' regular classroom, and
students who chose not to participate were required to continue their secular study in another part
of the school building. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), upheld a program in which reli-
gious classes were held outside the school premises. Because a student could be excused for only
religious reasons, one could argue that the Zorach scheme was not truly neutral. For this reason,
Zorach's viability could be questioned. See Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1975)
(upholding Zorach only because Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) described Zorach as
viable authority). Were Zorach to be overruled, the constitutionality of proposed Methods I and
IH would not be affected.
63. 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aft'dmen., 102 S. Ct. 1297 (1982).
64. 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 322 (1981).
65. No challenge was made to the portion of the statute allowing silent meditation, which to
the certain knowledge of any teacher of small, noisy children, clearly has a secular purpose.
66. 653 F.2d at 899.
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enhancing their awareness of the spiritual dimensions of human nature."67
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly rejected this argument:
[T]he plain language . .. of the Jefferson Parish guidelines makes
apparent their predominantly religious purpose. Prayer is perhaps
the quintessential religious practice for many of the world's faiths,
and it plays a significant role in the devotional lives of most religious
people. Indeed, since prayer is a primary religious activity in itself,
its observance in public school classrooms has, if anything, a more
obviously religious purpose than merely displaying a copy of a reli-
gious text in the classroom. Even if the avowed objective of the legis-
lature and school board is not itself strictly religious, it is sought to be
achieved through the observance of an intrinsically religious practice.
The unmistakable message of the Supreme Court's teachings is that
the state cannot employ a religious means to serve otherwise legiti-
mate secular interests.
68
The critical distinction between the Jefferson Parish scheme and Method
II is that the Jefferson Parish School Board prescribed prayer whereas Method
II prescribes a philosophical recitation. While one might argue that most phil-
osophical recitations will be prayers anyway and in some classes all may be,
the distinction is critical. The establishment clause prohibits the state from
favoring theistic prayers over other philosophical utterances; it does not pro-
hibit individuals from choosing theistic prayers.
An analogy to equal protection is appropriate. It is beyond doubt that a
school could not assign blacks to one side of a lunch room and whites to the
other.69 Yet the school could adopt a policy of unassigned lunch room seats
even if that policy resulted in segregated seating. The difference is that self
segregation is permitted whereas state-sponsored segregation is not.70 Simi-
larly, state-sponsored prayer is forbidden, but prayer without state encourage-
ment is permitted.
Judge Sharp's dissent accepts this dichotomy but fails to find state spon-
sorship in the Jefferson Parish program. As he viewed it:
There are only three ways in which a state could possibly treat
audible prayer in public schools; require it, allow it, or prohibit it.
Requiring it would be an elementary violation of the Establishment
Clause. But it seems to me that the state should be allowed to choose
between allowing audible prayer and prohibiting it.
71
The flaw in Judge Sharp's reasoning is his erroneous assumption that this
form of allowing prayer is content neutral. Surely, a rule that permitted stu-
dents to voluntarily recite "Hail Mary" before class would present a different
67. Id. at 900. The witnesses were two state legislators who sponsored the statute and the
school board member responsible for the resolution to implement the statute in Jefferson Parish.
68. Id. at 901.
69. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
70. "[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection
Clause unless to some significant extent the state in any of its manifestations has been found to
have become involved in it." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
71. 653 F.2d at 904 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
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constitutional question than a neutral rule allowing any philosophical recita-
tion. While the Jefferson Parish program does not specify the prayer, it does
require that the preclass recitation be a prayer and not some other philosophi-
cal utterance.
Judge Sharp and I are not far apart on this issue. We agree that
"[v]oluntariness is utterly irrelevant when the challenged legislation estab-
lishes the substantive content of a religious activity. Such legislation has the
primary effect of advancing not religious freedom, but a state religion."'72 He,
however, views the Jefferson Parish program* as content neutral. Notwith-
standing this view, he is rightly troubled that teachers, who "at least from the
perspective of students [are] government officials," 73 can offer the prayer.
Nevertheless, he concludes that the practice establishes religious freedom
rather than religion and is no more an establishment of religion than the free
exercise clause. 74
Although Judge Sharp's opinion is more thoughtful than many on this
subject,75 it is difficult to justify state-sanctioned prayer on free exercise princi-
ples when the same free exercise concerns can be accommodated by a truly
neutral method such as proposed Method II.
In Collins the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly invalidated a form
of voluntary prayer in a case that was much more complex than the court's
disturbingly simple opinion led one to believe:
Chandler High School is a public school in Chandler, Arizona. Peri-
odically during the year the Student Council plans and schedules stu-
dent assemblies and the school administration adjusts the regular
class schedule so that the assembly can be held within the school day.
Student Council officers conduct the assemblies and students not
wishing to attend may report to a supervised study hall.
During the 1977-78 and 1978-79 school years, the Chandler Stu-
dent Council requested permission to open assemblies with prayer.
The principal approved these requests with the knowledge and con-
currence of the superintendent and the Board of Education. In plan-
ning an assembly, the Student Council allotted a certain amount of
time on the agenda and selected one member of the student body to
say the prayer. The selected student was free to choose the manner
and words in which the prayer was delivered. On each assembly day,
the Council gave the principal an agenda that noted whether the
gathering would be opened with prayer.76
In the court's view, the school board could not allow prayer in schools at
all. Relying on cases such as Brandon v. Board of Education,77 the court held
72. Id. at 905.
73. Id at 906. See supra note 3.
74. 653 F.2d at 904.
75. See, ag., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. dnied, 102 S. Ct.
970 (1981).
76. 644 F.2d at 760-61.
77. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981). See supra text accompany-
[Vol. 61
SCHOOL PR4 YER AND THE OPEN FORUM
that merely permitting student prayer is unconstitutional. Although this phi-
losophy is contrary to that espoused in this article, the court did reach the
correct result.
78
The procedure invalidated in Collins is not Method I, since all of the stu-
dents participate except those who opt for the captive confines of the study
hall.7 9 One could argue that a prayer should not be deemed less voluntary
because a high percentage of the student body chooses to participate in it. The
difficulty with this reasoning is that the student council is a creature of the
school which represents the entire student body, making its action a form of
state action,80 rather than the action of each of the students as individuals.
The Collins scheme cannot be defended under Method II because the stu-
dent is selected to say a prayer, not a philosophical recitation, and he or she is
specifically chosen by the student council rather than selected at random. The
failure to select at random precludes application of the "open forum" concept,
and creates an unjustifiably high risk that the student will be chosen for the
probable content of his prayer. If the Chandler High School assembly were to
be opened by a philosophical recitation delivered by a student chosen at ran-
dom from among those expressing an interest, the issue would have been very
different. So long as the entire student body is made aware of this procedure,
thereby eliminating the danger of a student prayer being attributed to the
State, the procedure should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has regularly, but not uniformly, applied the "whole-
some neutrality" principle advocated in this article.
8 ' Lemon v. Kurtzman8 2
and its progeny8 3 severely restrict permissible state aid to the secular functions
of sectarian schools, but impose no similar restrictions on state aid to nonsec-
tarian schools. Thus, eligibility for aid depends on the nonreligious character
of the institution. At the other extreme, Sherbert v. Verner84 and Thomas v.
Review Board85 require the state to pay unemployment compensation to an
ing notes 24-27; See also Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark.
1973) (cited approvingly by the Collins court, 644 F.2d at 761-62).
78. 644 F.2d at 762.
79. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). A difference exists between offer-
ing students a "choice" between prayer and study hall, and offering students a free choice in how
to spend spare time before or after classes, during recess or during lunch. See Reed v. Van Hoven,
237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (upholding voluntary student prayer before or after school
because students who did not wish to participate did not have to be present).
80. See supra text accompanying note 69. Cf. Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C.
1975) (apparently assuming that the student constitution constituted state action), rev'd and re-
manded on other grounds, 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980).
81. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216, 222 (1963). See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAW 820-23 (1978); Ely, Legislative and.dainistrative Moti-
vation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1319-22 (1970).
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
84. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
85. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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employee who loses his job because of a religiously motivated inability to
comply with the job's conditions, even though compensation would not have
been paid if the inability were not religiously motivated.
Whatever may be the merits of these departures from neutrality, they
have no place in formulating the constitutional permissibility or impermissi-
bility of school prayers. The school can neither support nor be hostile towards
religion. It cannot be an apostle for either Jerry FalwelI8 6 or Madelyn
O'Hair.8 7 Method I and Method II fully accommodate any legitimate need
for free exercise of religion while maintaining strict neutrality. In addition,
they implement the Tinker admonition that schools not be "enclaves of totali-
tarianism," 88 but places where "leaders [are] trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.' "89
Because Methods I and II fully accommodate any need for prayer, and
because we do not need prayer which is any less voluntary than that arising
from these methods, the proposed school prayer amendment should not be
added to the Constitution.
86. A Lynchburg, Virginia Baptist minister who as head of the Moral Majority, a religious
organization, has become a spokesman for politically active, evangelical Christians.
87. A politically active atheist.
88. 393 U.S. at 511.
89. Id. at 512. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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